Defending and contesting the sovereignty of law: the public lawyer as interpretivist by Lakin, Stuart
Defending and contesting the sovereignty 
of law: the public lawyer as interpretivist 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Lakin, S. (2015) Defending and contesting the sovereignty of 
law: the public lawyer as interpretivist. Modern Law Review, 
78 (3). pp. 549­570. ISSN 0026­7961 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468­2230.12128 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/39402/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468­2230.12128 
Publisher: Wiley 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
REVIEW ARTICLE 
 
 
Defending and Contesting the Sovereignty of Law: the Public Lawyer as Interpretivist 
 
Stuart Lakin* 
 
  T. R. S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law Freedom, Constitution and Common Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2013, 361pp, hb £53.00.  
 
 
How do we determine the content of the law and the constitution in Britain - the legal and 
constitutional (or conventional) rights, duties and powers of individuals, officials and insti-
tutions?    
 
On one view, favoured by many UK public lawyers, we simply consult the relevant empiri-
cal facts: the rule(s) that identify the sources of law within the constitution, the intentions of 
parliament in its statutes, the rules of statutory interpretation, the dicta of judges, and the 
standards of conduct that officials have accepted as binding in their political practices.    In 
short, we describe the law and the constitution in much the same way as an anthropologist 
describes human behaviour, or an astronomer describes the arrangement of the planets.  
What we do not do is engage in controversial debates about the meaning and requirements 
of moral values such as the rule of law, democracy and liberty.  Such debates, on this view, 
are not pertinent to the question of what the content of the law and the constitution is, but 
only to what it should be.   Other people turn that empirical fact thesis (EFT) on its head.  
They say that the content of the law and the constitution depends on controversial argu-
ments of political morality.  Judges and lawyers must interpret statutes, precedents and po-
litical practices in the light of the values and principles that best justify those provisions - 
and which best justify the legal and constitutional order as a whole. On this view, every 
statement of the law and the constitution is the product of an interpretative judgment about 
which values and principles generate which rights, duties and powers.    This interpretative 
thesis (IT) denies that the content of the law and the constitution depends wholly on empiri-
cal facts. It holds that the public lawyer - in common with judges, practitioners and citizens 
- must argue like a philosopher, rather than describe like a social scientist.    
 
In his most recent book, The Sovereignty of Law Freedom, Constitution and Common Law 
(Sovereignty), Professor T R S Allan offers a robust defence of the second of these answers 
to the question posed above.  He contends that constitutional argument can only be interpre-
tative.  He thinks that the EFT is misconceived.  These methodological claims permeate his 
wide-ranging discussions of substantive issues in British constitutional law and practice.  He 
also devotes his final chapter to an extended philosophical consideration of them.    All that 
said, Sovereignty is not primarily a work in abstract constitutional methodology.  Allan's 
motivating concern is a very practical one.  He thinks that the traditional doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty and other tenets of British constitutional orthodoxy are incorrect be-
cause they are based on the EFT.  Conversely, he thinks that his distinctive theory of com-
mon law constitutionalism, based on a liberal, republican-inspired, conception of the rule of 
law, is correct because it reflects the IT.    His position seems to be this: if public lawyers 
argue in the correct (i.e. interpretative) way about the British constitution, then they must 
2 
 
reject the traditional model of absolute legislative power in favour of a model of limited 
power or 'legitimate authority'.
1
 
 
Whether or not one accepts Allan's methodological claims, or the way he marries them to 
particular visions of the constitution, he deserves high praise for approaching public law in 
this way.    Over many decades, he has underlined the need for public lawyers to engage 
with deeper debates in legal and political theory.
2
  Above all, he has insisted that supporters 
of constitutional orthodoxy explain and justify their position - rather than dogmatically as-
sume its correctness.     The chapters of Sovereignty carry these messages forward with 
greater force and philosophical rigour than anything he has previously written.   As impres-
sive as the substance of his arguments is the way that he conveys them.   Allan has a rare 
gift for bringing complex theories to life with clear and provocative analyses of cases and 
contemporary constitutional issues.  Indeed, one would get a very good sense of his EFT/IT 
distinction just by reading a selection of these analyses and nothing else.   His discussions of 
Liversidge (21-25),
3
 Prolife (25-31),
4
 Factortame (No 1)
5
 and (No 2)
6
 and Thoburn
7
 (146-
50), Jackson (150-153),
8
 R v A (No 2) (186-188),
9
 and Bancoult (chapter 8 generally),
10
 are 
particularly illuminating.  This is an unashamedly theory-heavy work, but it is one that will 
resonate with the most theory-averse 'black letter' public lawyer, and even with students 
finding their way into their constitutional law module.
11
 
 
I shall pursue two general objections to Allan's arguments in this review article, along with 
some incidental ones.  The first objection relates to his EFT/IT distinction.    I shall urge 
him to confront the EFT (which, I shall suggest, is really a large and varied number of dif-
ferent theses) as a rival to the IT, rather than dismiss it as the wrong type of argument.   This 
is to say that his objection to descriptive accounts of the constitution is better understood as 
a substantive rather than methodological one.   It concerns, I shall say, a difference in moral 
conviction about the proper role and importance of law and the rule of law within the consti-
tution.  Allan makes a compelling case for the ‘sovereignty’ of law as a guarantor of liberty 
and equal dignity.  But those who support the EFT typically ascribe a narrower, communi-
cative, function to law; and they see the rule of law as one value among a plurality of other, 
equally important values.   The virtue of the interpretative method, as elaborated by Ronald 
                                                 
*Lecturer in Law, University of Reading.  I am extremely grateful to Trevor Allan, Dimitrios Kyritsis and an 
anonymous reviewer for their challenging and gracious comments.    
 
1
 Sovereignty 120. 
2
 See, in particular, his earlier books:  Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitu-
tionalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
3
 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 
4
 R (Prolife) Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] EWCA Civ 297, [2003] UKHL 23. 
5
 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd [1990] 2 AC 85. 
6
 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
7
 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin). 
8
 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. 
9
 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25. 
10
 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2001] QB 1067, [2008] UKHL 
61. 
11
 Allan makes a point of beginning each chapter with an accessible overview of the detailed arguments that 
follow.  See Sovereignty 15. 
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Dworkin, is that it allows for genuine disagreement between fundamentally different theo-
ries such as these.
12
  I think this potential is regrettably lost in Sovereignty. 
 
Secondly, I shall argue that Allan is caught between a rock and a hard place in his account 
of constitutional interpretation.   If his position is that the British constitution - and constitu-
tions in general - must be interpreted in line with his liberal theory of the rule of law, then 
this is no kind of interpretation at all: the content of the law and the constitution will be the 
same irrespective of the particular legislative and judicial decisions that (supposedly) form 
the object of interpretation.    If, on the other hand, he proposes his rule of law theory as the 
best interpretation of practice and principle in Britain, then there is arguably a problem of 
fit.  His court-centric theory arguably underplays a range of constitutional features that point 
towards a greater role for the political branches of government.     I have in mind, in particu-
lar, the scheme of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998).  The section 4 declaration of 
incompatibility - favoured by those who think Parliament should be the primary forum for 
rights protection - is almost invisible in Sovereignty.    Allan sometimes seems to treat sec-
tion 3 as the only constitutionally acceptable route for judges to take.    
 
I shall structure this review in three parts.  In the first part, I shall offer a summary of Allan's 
arguments.   The following two parts will correspond to the two general objections just de-
scribed. 
 
 
ALLAN'S METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
At the foundations of Allan's argument in Sovereignty is his rejection of the EFT (the empir-
ical fact thesis), and his advocacy of the IT (the interpretative thesis) as a method for deter-
mining the content of the law and the constitution in Britain.   There are countless state-
ments of this position throughout his chapters.  Here are two particularly clear early exam-
ples:  
 
‘[W]e cannot identify the content of law with a merely descriptive account of judicial practice, 
viewed as a matter of empirical fact: it is a product of normative judgment in which we attempt to 
make good moral sense of an array of such familiar legal ‘sources’ as Acts of Parliament, judicial 
precedent and influential dicta.   An account of English law on any specific subject is always a the-
ory of how best to read the relevant legal materials, guided by notions of justice and coherence: we 
assume that law, correctly interpreted, should as far as possible serve the interests of justice, rather 
than injustice, and be broadly coherent rather than confused and contradictory.  And this is true 
even when we disagree about what justice requires, or about what would make the law more coher-
ent overall’.13 
and 
                                                 
12
 See, in particular, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Law’s Empire 
(London, Fontana, 1986); Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006); Justice for 
Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
13
 Sovereignty 5. 
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‘This book denies that there is any neutral, detached, descriptive ground on which a lawyer may 
stand in drawing conclusions about the requirements of English (or Scottish or European) law, in 
general, or the content of the British constitution, in particular.  It insists that any statement of law is 
always a matter of interpretation, and that interpretation is (in the present context) necessarily nor-
mative: it draws on moral and political ideas and values to support one reading rather than anoth-
er’.14 
In advancing these methodological claims, Allan consciously takes sides in the stickiest of 
debates in legal theory.   He is with the so-called 'anti-positivists' who contend a) that the 
content of the law depends, at least in part, on moral facts or principles, b) that judges 
should ordinarily decide cases according to law, c) that when judges and lawyers disagree, 
they are disagreeing about what the law is, and d) that citizens have a general duty to obey 
the law.   He is against those positivists who contend a) that the content of the law is ex-
hausted by empirical facts (typically about what particular people have said, thought, or 
written), b) that the moral questions of how judges should decide cases, and whether the law 
is just, are distinct from the question of what content the law has, c) that when judges and 
lawyers disagree, they are disagreeing about what the law should be, and d) that neither citi-
zens nor judges have a general duty to obey (or enforce) the law.    How we assess the over-
all arguments in Sovereignty will inevitably hang on what we make of this debate and Al-
lan's treatment of it.  My first general objection in the next section will take up this issue. 
 
As one would expect, Allan applies these abstract philosophical puzzles to recognizable, 
concrete concerns.    In the first place, he warns us about the greater or lesser practical sig-
nificance of public law scholarship depending on which method is correct.   If the IT is cor-
rect, then public lawyers' disagreements about the meaning and requirements of the rule of 
law, democracy, the separation of powers, and so on, are directly 'pertinen[t] to the admin-
istration of justice, as opposed to academic debate and criticism'.
15
   If the EFT is correct, 
then the opposite holds true: public law debates are peripheral to settled understandings of 
the law 'as it is'.
16
   Allan is understandably keen to show that works such as Sovereignty are 
as relevant to the day-to-day work of judges and lawyers as they are to Law Commission 
reports and student dissertations.    Secondly, he sees the EFT/IT distinction as the key to 
settling the correct understanding of the contemporary British constitution.     His view, in a 
sentence, is this:  constitutional orthodoxy is flawed because it is based on a flawed method 
of argument, namely the EFT; common law constitutionalism is correct because is based on 
the correct method of argument, namely the IT. 
 
What is not always entirely clear is the precise relationship Allan envisages between the IT 
and his own distinctive theory of common law constitutionalism and the rule of law.   On 
the one hand, as we see from the passages quoted above, he does not seem to want to inject 
the IT with any particular scheme of ‘moral and political ideas and values’: he concedes 
that people will disagree ‘about what justice requires, or what would make the law more co-
herent overall.’ On the other hand, he sometimes seems to equate the IT with the particular 
values, basic liberties and institutional arrangements that belong to his theory of common 
                                                 
14
 ibid 9. 
15
 ibid 4.  
16
 ibid 5. 
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law constitutionalism and legality as independence.   This tension comes out in the follow-
ing recurrent claim: 
 
‘Any statement of law depends on our shared commitment to legality - a moral ideal connected to 
related ideals of freedom, justice and equality’.17      
 
What does he mean by ‘our shared commitment’?  One possibility is that every interpreta-
tion of the constitution must be guided by the same abstract values, albeit that people may 
disagree about their precise meaning and requirements.    This reading recalls Dworkin’s 
theory of law as integrity: that the content of the law depends on whichever scheme of jus-
tice, fairness and due process is instantiated within the practice.
18
   On this understanding, 
we would say that Allan’s own account of legality as independence is, in his view, the one 
that makes best moral sense of British constitutional practice.    The second possibility is 
that everyone implicitly shares Allan’s own detailed understanding of legality, freedom, jus-
tice and equality, such that all other ways of interpreting statutes, precedents and doctrines 
are mistaken.    Each of these understandings throws up a number of practical and philo-
sophical questions.    This aspect of Sovereignty will be the focus of my second general ob-
jection in the last part of this article.    Until then, I shall purposefully leave the meaning of 
the IT ambiguous between these two understandings. 
 
Let us now look at Allan's theory of the rule of law, and at how this theory translates into an 
account of the British constitution.  The rule of law (or legality), he says, is a ‘basic princi-
ple of British government, underpinning its character as a liberal democratic polity’.19  It is 
an ‘ideal of constitutionalism’.20      The particular conception of the rule of law that should 
(or must?) guide constitutional interpretation, he contends, is one 
 
‘...under which each person’s freedom (or liberty) is secured, consistently with the enjoyment of a 
similar freedom for everyone. The kind of freedom I have in mind is autonomy or independence, 
understood as a guarantee against arbitrary interference - interference at the will or pleasure of other 
persons, whether private citizens or public officials, unregulated by legal rules enforced by inde-
pendent courts’.
21
 
 
This model of the ‘rule of law as independence’ is 
 
‘ultimately a principle of equal citizenship, precluding arbitrary distinctions between persons, irrel-
evant to any legitimate public purpose’.22 It ‘...imposes a requirement of justification, connecting 
restrictions on liberty to a public or common good, open to fearless public debate and challenge’ .23      
 
Crucially, it is the responsibility of courts to articulate the precise requirements of equal cit-
izenship through their common law decisions.  And it is an ‘inherent feature of the rule of 
                                                 
17
 ibid 8. 
18
 See, in particular, Dworkin, Law’s Empire n 12  above, chs. 6 and 7.  Allan regularly refers approvingly to 
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.  See, for example, Sovereignty 162-3 and the Appendix.    
19
 Sovereignty 91. 
20
 ibid 95. 
21
 ibid 89. 
22
 ibid 12. 
23
 ibid 91. 
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law’ that judges possess the power to quash a measure that cannot be interpreted in line with 
the rule of law.
24
       It is in these senses that the Britain has a 'common law constitution'.    
While Allan clearly places much store in judges and courts, he is not straightforwardly ad-
vocating judicial supremacy or juristocracy.   He frequently emphasizes that citizens must 
judge for themselves whether particular judgments (even of the Supreme Court), administra-
tive decisions, Acts of Parliament, or the legal order as a whole contribute to the 'common 
good', such as to be worthy of their allegiance.
25
     And it is his enduring theme that the law 
depends both on ordinary democratic procedures and on the requirements of the rule of law.   
Neither parliament nor courts have the 'last word' on any matter.
26
  In these respects, he lo-
cates sovereignty in the individual bearer of rights, the constitution, and law, rather than in 
any particular institution.
27
      
 
Allan develops and refines this account of the rule of law, the separation of powers and po-
litical obligation in the engine-room chapter of the book.
28
    Many readers will find much 
intrigue in his exegeses and adaptations of the work of Locke, Hayek, Dicey, Fuller, 
Dworkin and Kant, and in his invocation of the republican ideal of non-domination.
29
   One 
potentially fruitful line of inquiry - which I shall not pursue here - is whether non-
domination is best secured by judges or by the political branches of government.    Put dif-
ferently, is it executive or judicial discretion that poses the greater threat to individual liber-
ty and autonomy?    Allan and Pettit
30
 think the former; others such as Bellamy think the lat-
ter.
31
    Suffice it to note, in anticipation of my arguments in the second section below, that 
particular political communities may adopt a variety of different institutional arrangements 
to secure individual liberty and autonomy (and/or other values).   It would be a mistake, in 
my view, for Allan to attempt to homogenize all constitutions.
32
 
 
Throughout Sovereignty, Allan works through the implications of his rule of law theory for 
the contemporary British constitution.  His chapters all follow roughly the same structure.   
He connects some aspect of the British constitutional orthodoxy with the EFT.   He explains 
(or recapitulates) what is wrong with the EFT and what is right about the IT.  He then offers 
an alternative rule of law as independence reading of the relevant feature of legal or consti-
tutional practice.     Let me give some examples of this sequence, excluding for the moment 
his more abstract philosophical arguments against the EFT and for the IT.     The examples 
follow roughly the order of his chapters.   I shall mark against each substantive argument 
the method that Allan associates with it. 
 
                                                 
24
 ibid 37 
25
 ibid 160-167. 
26
 ibid 133. 
27
 ibid ch. 1 in general. 
28
 ibid ch. 3 in general. 
29
 The leading account is Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1997). 
30
 See Pettit op. cit. 
31
 See Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of De-
mocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  But Allan makes an interesting argument in his 
final chapter that Bellamy is in fact pro- judicial review.  See Sovereignty 315-317.   For an interesting re-
ductio argument against judges having ultimate decision-making authority, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Par-
liamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 85. 
32
 See section two below. 
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(EFT) There is a clear distinction between law and constitutional convention, justiciable and 
non-justiciable powers, and the 'legal' and 'political' parts of the constitution.    A norm is 
legal if it has been formally laid down by a legislature or court.  A norm is conventional if 
politicians and statesmen have accepted it as binding in their political practices.    Whether a 
norm is justiciable or not depends on the rules laid down by judges.  Non-justiciable powers 
governed by constitutional convention comprise the 'political constitution'; justiciable pow-
ers governed by law comprise the 'legal constitution'.
33
 
(IT) There is no clear distinction between law and convention: 'public law concerns the 
conduct of government; and legal interpretation cannot be divorced from political practice, 
whose principles and assumptions are necessarily pertinent to competent legal analysis'.
34
    
The content of a constitutional convention depends on its underlying principle, context and 
purpose.
35
  There is no clear line between justiciable and non-justiciable areas of govern-
ment: ‘Justiciability cannot be settled by reference to judicial dicta in prominent cases: such 
dicta must be subjected to critical inquiry on the basis of legal principle, informed by a de-
veloped account of the central ideal of legality or the rule of law’.36   Legal and political 
practice are 'too intertwined and interdependent to sustain [a distinction between the legal 
and political constitution].'
37
    
 
(EFT) The legal powers of Parliament and courts depend on the beliefs of most judges and 
officials, as evidenced by legal precedents and political practice.
38
   Most officials accept 
and have historically accepted that Parliament has absolute legislative power, and that 
courts cannot strike down legislation.  This is the rule of recognition of the legal system.
39
    
If Parliament were to pass a statute requiring the execution of blue-eyed babies, that statute 
would be legally valid, albeit that judges and citizens would have a moral duty to disobey 
it.
40
    
(IT) Parliament does not possess absolute legislative power.  Legislative supremacy (Al-
lan’s preferred term) ‘may [only] operate within the constitutional framework of the rule of 
law’.41   ‘Parliament’s authority is confined by the limits of our ability (in any concrete con-
text) to interpret its enactments as contributions to the public good’.42  It follows that a stat-
ute is only recognisable as such if it can be read in a way that is compatible with the princi-
ple of equal citizenship and other rule of law values.
43
      The blue-eyed babies statute 
would be unlawful 'even if, absurdly, the Supreme Court affirmed it'.
44
 
 
(EFT) Statutes communicate a ‘speaker’s meaning‘, the meaning that parliament intended.45  
This intention may reflect the mental states of legislators, or the meaning that legislators 
                                                 
33
 Sovereignty chapter 2 
34
 ibid 56. 
35
 ibid. 
36
 ibid 10.     
37
 ibid 57. 
38
 ibid 18. 
39
 ibid.  The strict rule is usually expressed as ‘what the Queen enacts in Parliament is law’.  See H L A Hart, 
The Concept of Law 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) ch. 6. 
40
 Sovereignty 23. 
41
 ibid 133. 
42
 ibid 12. 
43
 ibid 33. 
44
 ibid 142. 
45
 ibid 193. 
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would have had had they put their minds to a particular problem, or the literal meaning of 
the statutory text.   
(IT) The interpretation of a statute requires us to construct the intent of the ‘ideal or repre-
sentative legislator’ who seeks to reconcile ‘current policy and overarching legal princi-
ple’.46  There is then no conflict between Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law, or 
between the ultra vires and common law theories of judicial review.  These ideas are inter-
dependent, embodying the twin imperatives of democracy and respect for individual dignity 
and autonomy.
47
    
 
(EFT) The existence and content of the law is a separate concern to how judges should ad-
judicate on legal disputes.
48
  Judges have no general duty to apply the law.  It may be ap-
propriate for them to disregard the law, for instance, to promote democracy, institutional ef-
ficiency, comity, or justice.   This extra-legal area of judicial decision making demands an 
independent doctrine of judicial deference.
49
     
(IT) There is no independent doctrine of judicial deference.   ‘The relevant considerations of 
constitutional legitimacy and institutional expertise are already implicit constraints on judi-
cial review - reflected in ordinary legal reasoning...’50 
 
This is just a flavour of the main arguments that appear in some of Allan's richly argued 
chapters.   The various contrasting claims about the constitution will no doubt be familiar to 
public lawyers.   What may be less familiar is the way that Allan pulls together these differ-
ent substantive positions with different methods of constitutional analysis.     As I have said 
above, this coupling of practice and theory is the defining virtue of Allan's work in general, 
but it is especially prominent in Sovereignty.     
 
An important marker to lay down for our later discussions is that Allan's target in 
Sovereignty must be wider than the particular orthodox claims - and particular empirical 
facts on which those claims are based - outlined above.  Given his wholesale rejection of the 
EFT, we must take Allan to be attacking any constitutional theory that makes the content of 
the law depend ultimately on empirical facts – whatever the relevant empirical facts might 
be.   This is important because many people who accept the EFT reject British constitution-
al orthodoxy or certain aspects of it.  For example, Barber, applying the legal positivism of 
Joseph Raz, seeks to refute parliamentary sovereignty on the basis that European Communi-
ty Law and parliamentary law both make conflicting claims to supremacy which cannot be 
settled by any ranking rules.
51
   His view is that the relative powers of Parliament and courts 
in the British constitution are legally indeterminate.   Another way of putting the general 
point is that there are a plethora of different empirical fact theses (or different versions of 
                                                 
46
 ibid 194. 
47
 ibid 168 and see ch. 5 in general.  
48
 ibid 6-7. 
49
 See, for instance, Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ 
(2010) 126 LQR 222-50. 
50
 Sovereignty 241 and ch. 7 in general.    
51
 See N W Barber, The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapters 9 and 10.  
See, further, Barber, ‘Sovereignty Re-examined: the Courts, Parliament and Statutes’ (2000) 20 OJLS 131-
154; 'The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty' 9 Int'l J. Const. L. (I·CON) (2011). 
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legal positivism) which recommend diverse constitutional theories.
52
     Allan's argument 
must be that none of these theses and theories can elucidate the British constitution. 
 
The question I have purposefully left hanging is why Allan thinks that the IT is correct and 
the EFT incorrect.   (Actually, he uses rather stronger language than 'incorrect'.  The de-
scriptive method, he says, is ‘dogmatic’;53 and the orthodox claims that flow from it are 
‘simply confused and misguided’54).   This question drills down to the foundations of Al-
lan's edifice in Sovereignty.   It challenges him to explain or justify his rejection of legal 
positivism in favour of anti-positivism.   He responds with two arguments.    
 
First, he contends that people who adopt the EFT misunderstand the true nature of legal and 
constitutional argument, where those who adopt the IT properly grasp it.    He continually 
accuses EFT supporters of doing the wrong intellectual discipline.   By treating statutes, 
precedents and political practices as 'social or psychological phenomena', they mistakenly 
take the detached, 'external point of view' of (for instance) an historian, political scientist or 
anthropologist.     For Allan, the constitutional theorist must take up the same position as a 
judge or lawyer attempting to work out the content of the law in particular cases.   She must 
take the morally engaged, 'internal perspective appropriate to an interpretation of the law'
55
 
or appropriate to legal reasoning.    This is to recognize that 'to be a lawyer is to be, at least 
in part, a legal philosopher...'
56
  and that ‘legal analysis cannot be detached from constitu-
tional theory’.57    
 
At times, Allan reinforces this first argument in the following way.  He claims that public 
lawyers who support the EFT have misappropriated theories of legal positivism which were 
not intended to be used as constitutional theories.    He picks out, in particular, 
Goldsworthy's celebrated Hartian defence of parliamentary sovereignty.
58
   Hart famously 
characterized his seminal work the Concept of Law as an 'essay in descriptive sociology’.59   
His aim, he explained, was to identify the main elements of law common to all legal sys-
tems at all times.
60
  At one point in his general argument, he remarks that the rule of recog-
nition in England is 'what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law', understood as 'continuing' 
parliamentary sovereignty.
61
   Allan reasons that this reference to parliamentary sovereignty 
                                                 
52
 Equally, the same version of the EFT can generate a variety of different constitutional theories.  Adam 
Tucker rejects absolute parliamentary sovereignty on the basis that the Hartian rule of recognition is inde-
terminate on the question of whether English law or EC law is supreme.  See Tucker, 'Uncertainty in the 
Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty' (2011) 31 OJLS 61-88.  Goldsworthy  
entertains the possibility that the empirical-fact-based rule of recognition might change from parliamentary 
sovereignty to something like common law constitutionalism.   See Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty 
above n 31, 139-40.    
53
 Sovereignty 50. 
54
 ibid 340. 
55
 ibid 32.    
56
 ibid 9. 
57
 ibid 22. 
58
 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999) especially chs. 1, 2 and 10; Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereigty above n 31, 47-57.    
59
 Above n 39, preface. 
60
 ibid ch. 1.   For a very helpful analysis, see J Dickson, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey’ 
Legal Theory 10 (2004) 117-156    
61
 Hart above n 39, 74-78. 
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is part of Hart's descriptive survey of legal systems, rather than a proper basis for a theory of 
the British constitution.    In what I think is a wrong turning in Sovereignty, he charges 
Goldsworthy with ‘taking refuge in bland sociological notion of law’,62 and ‘hiding behind 
the attitude of senior officials’.63     I shall suggest in the next section below that Allan and 
Goldsworthy (and indeed Hart) have a genuine and important disagreement about law and 
the constitution, one that must ultimately be resolved at the level of political morality.   
 
The second argument for the IT and against the EFT is based on evidence from a formidable 
range of case analyses.   Allan's aim, it seems, is to show that judges do in fact reason inter-
pretatively rather than descriptively when they decide cases.      I shall give just one exam-
ple of this strategy, highlighting in square brackets the different methods in play. 
 
In Liversidge,
64
 the House of Lords had to determine the meaning of the phrase ‘If the Sec-
retary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associa-
tions he may order the detention of that person’.65  The majority ruled that executive discre-
tion was unfettered in the absence of proof of bad faith.   On Allan’s reading, Lord Atkin in 
his dissent ‘appealed beyond the prevailing judicial consensus [EFT] to a vision of the con-
stitution that afforded better protection of liberty [IT]’.66    ‘What may appear on a superfi-
cial reading to be a somewhat technical debate about language [EFT] - Atkin laid great em-
phasis on the ordinary legal implications of ‘reasonable cause’ - was in truth a more funda-
mental debate over the proper role of the judiciary’ [IT]. ‘Rival interpretations of law re-
flected deep-seated difference of constitutional vision: they exposed the gulf between under-
lying conceptions of the rule of law’ [IT].67   Lord Hoffmann was arguably wrong to assert 
in the later A
68
 decision that Parliament suspended habeas corpus during the World Wars.
69
   
This is so ‘only by effect of the majority opinions in Halliday70 and Liversidge'.71  These are 
matters of ‘legal interpretation [IT] rather than observable empirical fact [EFT]’.72     
Note Allan's use of phrases such as 'what may appear on a superficial reading' and 'was in 
truth'.   Elsewhere, he describes cases as being 'more plausibly' read in line with the IT than 
the EFT.
73
    We shall consider below whether he does enough to show that his IT reading of 
Liversidge and other cases (and of the constitution in general) is the true one, and other 
readings false.    
                                                 
62
 Sovereignty 38 
63
 ibid 156-157   
64
 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 
65
 Regulation 18B of the Defence Regulations 1939. 
66
 Sovereignty 21. 
67
 ibid 21-22. 
68
 A v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2004] UKHL 56. 
69
 Sovereignty 23 citing David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 183. 
70
 R v Halliday, ex parte Zadig [1917] AC 260. 
71
 Sovereignty 23. 
72
 ibid. 
73
 ibid, for instance, at 144 in relation to different readings of R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 
56. 
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Having summarised Allan's main arguments, it is worth pausing to reflect on the scale of his 
ambition in Sovereignty.   His primary target - the various tenets of British constitutional 
orthodoxy - is an understanding of the constitution that ostensibly attracts widespread sup-
port from judges, lawyers and officials, and which leading jurists and political philosophers 
have supported through the ages.
74
  He is also attacking the popular and intuitively appeal-
ing view that the content of the law is determined by what legislators and judges have said, 
written, thought or believed.
75
  In place of this picture, he is proposing a radical (at least by 
the lights of the orthodoxy) reading of the British constitution with little explicit contempo-
rary or historic support.   He is also offering a somewhat counter-intuitive understanding of 
law.  On his IT view, the content of the law may depend on principles which no legislator or 
judge has endorsed or even thought of.
76
   This means, he often stresses, that Supreme Court 
rulings may not reflect the true state of the law.
77
   It also means that the so-called 'unwrit-
ten' British constitution operates in much the same way as the written constitutions of the 
US and elsewhere.
78
   As if to raise the level of ambition higher still, he is not just saying 
that British constitutional orthodoxy (and other EFT accounts of the constitution) is incor-
rect, but that it is misconceived.    He thinks that its supporters have fundamentally misun-
derstood how lawyers and judges really argue and decide cases: that they are busy doing so-
ciology instead of legal and constitutional analysis.     
 
METHODOLOGICAL IMPASSE OR SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT? 
 
My first objection to Sovereignty picks up where the last section left off.    It concerns Al-
lan's reasons for rejecting the EFT in favour of the IT (and, by extension, his reasons for re-
jecting accounts of the constitution based on the EFT in favour of those based on the IT).    
On a strategic level, it must be said that Allan is unlikely to win over or engage his many 
public law adversaries with his methodological arguments.    The natural response of EFT 
supporters will be to throw his arguments straight back at him.    They will insist that it is he 
who has misunderstood the true (positivist) nature of law and adjudication; and they will 
insist that it is he, not they, who is doing the wrong intellectual discipline, namely mistaking 
a theory of the ideal constitution for the descriptive reality of the existing constitution.
79
     
Similarly, they are unlikely to be convinced by Allan's case analyses.   Even if they agree 
that there are practical or conceptual difficulties with the - rather primitive - version of the 
                                                 
74
 This is the 'historical' argument put forward by Goldsworthy in favour of parliamentary sovereignty.   See, 
generally, above n 58.  Cf Paul Craig, 'Public Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory' [2000] PL 211-39 
(putting forward a competing historical argument in favour of the common law constitution).   
75
 Allan grudgingly describes this view as the 'common sense' view.   See Sovereignty 5. 
76
 ibid 207.    
77
 ibid, for instance, at 6-7 and 142. 
78
 ibid 251, relying on Lord Hoffmann's celebrated dictum in R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p 
Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131.   See, further, Jeffrey Jowell, 'Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Con-
text of Judicial Review' [1999] PL 448-60.    
79
 This is one way of understanding the exchanges between John Griffith and various common law constitu-
tionalists.  See, for instance, J. A. G. Griffith, 'The Brave New World of Sir John Laws' (2000) 63 MLR 159; 
'The Common Law and the Political Constitution' (2001) 117 LQR 42-67.  Similarly, see Dawn Oliver, 'Par-
liament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defence of the Sovereignty of Parliament' in Alex 
Horne, Gavin Drewry and Oliver (eds) Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2013), 309-337, 321 (argu-
ing that there is a gap between constitutional theory and practice).      
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EFT that Allan associates with constitutional orthodoxy, there are countless alternative ver-
sions which they might summon in its stead.
80
   Drawing on more sophisticated positivist 
theories of law and adjudication,
81
 they might say that the content of the law depends on 
rules that are partly indeterminate, or which direct judges to reason morally (say, about the 
meaning of the separation of powers or proportionality). They might say that judges are 
guided by legal rules even when those rules do not directly control the case.  They might say 
that the meaning of statutes is not determined by the mental states of legislators, or by the 
literal meaning of words, but by those rules and conventions of statutory interpretation that 
ensure that statutes communicate authoritatively.       
 
If we return to Allan's analysis of Liversidge, we can certainly see how the IT fits the fa-
mous dissent of Lord Atkin.    The question is whether Allan does enough to rule out an 
EFT reading of the court's reasoning.   He may well persuade us that the disagreement of the 
judges was not a semantic one about the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable cause'; but that 
hardly exhausts the possible EFT readings.   An EFT supporter might contend that the ma-
jority applied a legal rule or presumption, namely that legislation should not be read in ac-
cordance with the liberty of the subject during times of war.
82
    In that case, they will say, 
Lord Atkin's dissent amounted to a call for the majority to change or ignore that rule on ex-
tra-legal, moral, grounds.  Alternatively, we might think that Lord Atkin’s decision was cor-
rect, not on the IT basis that he was reasoning directly about liberty, the rule of law and the 
separation of powers, but on the EFT basis that he was following a rule directing the court 
to reason morally about those principles. Allan is surely correct to say that the decision in 
Liversidge depended on, or involved, moral reasoning, but that conclusion is perfectly com-
patible with the EFT.
83
   The fact that judges and lawyers frequently 'appeal[] to 
legitimacy'
84
 in their judgments and arguments cannot not settle whether those appeals are to 
legal or (extra-legal) moral principles. 
 
Take instead the case of Anisminic.
85
   Allan sees the decision as follows: ‘In affirming the 
sovereignty of law-the subjection of powerful bodies to legal principles, enforced by inde-
pendent courts- the House of Lords bolstered the sovereignty of Parliament’.86    
Goldsworthy, by contrast, suggests that ‘The judges’ claim to be faithful to Parliament’s in-
tention was a ‘noble lie’ used to conceal judicial obedience’.87    In other words, he thinks 
that judges decided to disregard the settled law and decide the case on moral grounds.    An-
                                                 
80
 Allan targets a particularly simplistic all-or-nothing form of positivist adjudication, whereby judges either 
apply legal norms or they exercise unconstrained discretion.  Dworkin is arguably guilty of the same thing in 
his work.   For criticism, see, for instance, Joseph Raz, 'Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain', 74 Cal. L. Rev. 
1103 (1986) 1115-1118; John Gardner, 'Legal Positivism: 5/12 Myths' 46 Am. J. Juris. 199 2001; Timothy 
Endicott, 'Adjudication and the Law' (2007) 27 OJLS 311-326; Nigel Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 196-197. 
81
 See, most notably, the theory of adjudication in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) ch. 10. 
82
 Allan considers such a rule at Sovereignty 21:  ‘[the liberty-principle had] no relevance in dealing with 
executive measure by way of preventing a public danger’ per Viscount Maugham 218.    
83
 See Gardner above, n 72. 
84
 Sovereignty 210.    
85
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
86
 ibid 35.    
87
 The Sovereignty of Parliament n 58 above, 252.  See, further, Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty 
above n 31, 286. 
13 
 
other theorist might argue that there was a pertinent rule directing judges to apply principles 
of the rule of law.
88
    Each of these options gives an explanation of the Anisminic decision; 
and we can suppose that supporters of these (and other) options genuinely believe that they 
have read the case correctly, and that others have read the case incorrectly.
89
   The difficulty 
here is that Allan gives us no reason to prefer his explanation over others (at least beyond 
asserting that other explanations belong to a different intellectual discipline).  In the absence 
of some independent standard(s) of success for assessing one reading of a case against oth-
ers, we face potentially unlimited readings of the same case, each reading being as viable as 
every other.
90
 Imagine that a particularly resourceful researcher demonstrates that in every 
House of Lords decision in favour of the claimant (plaintiff) in 1969, the majority wore a 
wristwatch, or skipped breakfast, or walked to work.     He may be convinced that one or 
other of these explanations tells us what truly happened in Anisminic.     Allan gives us no 
reason to discount his explanation.   
 
The strategic problems just described are symptomatic of a deeper philosophical problem 
with the way that supporters both of the IT and EFT sometimes attempt to meet one an-
other's arguments.   The problem, I suggest, is that both sides seek to establish descriptively 
that their thesis is correct.    They suppose that if we study closely the way that judges and 
lawyers reason, and the way that the concept of law figures in people's social and political 
practices, then we will surely arrive at their thesis.
91
   Legal philosophers refer to this type 
of argument as conceptual analysis.
92
    This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive ex-
position or refutation of that type of argument, but I want to introduce just one way of at-
tacking it.   The nature of the attack should appeal to Allan - if not so readily to supporters 
of the EFT.     
 
The starting point is that the content of the law must depend in some way on what Parlia-
ment has enacted, and on what judges have decided (which is to say that the phrase 'English 
law' is not simply another way referring, for instance, to the requirements of ideal justice, or 
                                                 
88
 This is one reading of Sir William Wade who contends that ‘the courts have been forced to rebel against 
Parliament’, applying ‘a presumption that may override their constitutional obedience, namely that jurisdic-
tion limits must be legally effective’.  Wade, Administrative Law, 720-1, cited by Allan at Sovereignty 215 n 
17 . 
89
 Another good illustration is the different readings of Riggs v Palmer (1889) 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 of-
fered by Goldsworthy and Allan.   See Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty n 23 above, 284-285; Allan, 
Sovereignty 198-200.     
90
 Mark Greenberg has called this the problem of 'global indeterminacy'.   See M. Greenberg, 'How Facts 
Make Law' in Scott Hershovitz (ed.) Exploring Law's Empire, ch. 10.   I have made this same type of argu-
ment in Stuart Lakin 'How to Make Sense of the HRA 1998: The Ises and Oughts of the British Constitution' 
(2010) 30 OJLS 399-417 (a review of Alison L Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights 
Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009)). 
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209.   For a perceptive critique, see N W Barber, The Constitutional State n 51 above, ch. 1, especially 8-11.   
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 For an illuminating discussion of conceptual analysis, see N. Stavropoulos, 'Hart's Semantics' in Jules 
Coleman (ed.) Hart's Postscript Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 
2001), ch. 3.  For an admirable attempt to apply this type of descriptive method to English public law, see 
Peter Cane, ‘Public Law in The Concept of Law’ (2013) 33 OJLS 649-674, 654. 
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the Ten Commandments).
93
     To put this more abstractly, the law must depend, at least in 
part, on facts about British legal practice.    It plausibly depends on descriptive facts about 
particular people's beliefs, intentions, utterances, texts and so on; and it plausibly depends 
on moral facts, for instance the values and principles that figure in statutes and precedents, 
or which are presupposed or entailed by them.   All of these facts, let us say, are among the 
candidates for making the content of the law what it is; none of these facts either have au-
tomatic legal relevance or irrelevance.
94
    We need an argument, then, to show which puta-
tive law-making facts, configured in which way, are constitutive of the law, and which puta-
tive law-making facts are legally redundant.      Crucially, that argument cannot be based on 
how particular people think, speak, act, or otherwise behave.   The fact that judges and 
lawyers refer to - or implicitly rely on - certain standards (moral principles, rules, intentions, 
or whatever) in their judgments and arguments cannot non-question-beggingly make it the 
case that those standards are constitutive of the content of the law.     This is because facts 
about what judges and lawyers do are themselves candidate law-making facts whose legal 
relevance requires an independent explanation.   
 
That is a highly compressed summary of a complex argument.  I shall not attempt to unpack 
it further here.  Its upshot is that something other than putative law-making facts is needed 
to show why the law is based on empirical or moral facts (or on some combination of both).     
Allan can neither disprove the EFT nor prove the IT by pointing to the 'perspective' or 'point 
of view' of judges, lawyers and constitutional theorists (or indeed by citing Hart's aims in 
his writing).     Another way of putting the point is that we cannot descriptively determine 
whether the EFT or the IT is correct.     That may initially sound like Allan's own methodo-
logical stance, but the argument I am making works on a different level of analysis.    We 
are not saying with Allan that the law cannot depend on empirical facts; we are saying that 
it cannot be descriptively true that law depends on empirical facts - just as it cannot be de-
scriptively true that law depends on moral facts.
95
     We need a non-descriptive argument to 
tell us which facts are constitutive of the law.   The argument we need, I suggest, is an in-
terpretative one. Someone attempting to make sense of the constitution must offer a moral 
theory to justify the legal relevance of some facts over others - a theory that can explain why 
the law imposes genuine moral obligations.
96
    That line of argument should appeal to Al-
lan, but it is quite different to one he takes in Sovereignty.    It supposes that the disagree-
ment between proponents of EFT and IT is a substantive rather than a methodological one.  
It further supposes that descriptivists and interpretavists are all arguing from the same inter-
pretative perspective: just as people who think that the content of the law depends on empir-
ical facts rather than moral interpretation must argue interpretatively for that position, so 
people who think that the law depends on moral interpretation must argue interpretatively 
for that position.  If these conclusions are correct, then we can push to one side our fears 
                                                 
93
 I am relying, in particular, on the argument in Greenberg above n 81.   See, further, N Stavropoulos, ‘Why 
Principles?’ (unpublished) available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023758> ac-
cessed 9 September, 2014. 
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 Dworkin describes such facts as 'pre-interpretative'.  See Dworkin Law's Empire above, n 12 , 65-66. 
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 See R Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 OJLS 1–37.    
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view, see J Raz, 'Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison' in Jules Coleman, 
Hart's Postscript n 92 above.. 
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about a methodological impasse in public law.   Instead of assertion and counter-assertion  
about who is working within the correct discipline, we can expect supporters of the IT and 
EFT to construct rival justifications for British constitutional practice.    That is precisely 
the character of disagreement about law and the constitution envisioned by Ronald Dworkin 
in his groundbreaking work on interpretation.    Allan, I think, has regrettably - and perhaps 
unwittingly - reverted to the very type of conceptual reasoning that Dworkin sought to re-
sist.
97
    
 
What might an EFT interpretation of the constitution look like?   There are numerous possi-
bilities.    The most likely justification for an orthodox interpretation of the constitution is a 
'political constitutionalist' conception of democracy, the rule of law and the separation of 
powers.  I shall consider this type of interpretation in some depth in the next section.  Alter-
natively, supporters of the orthodoxy might recast Goldsworthy's Hartian defence of parlia-
mentary sovereignty as an interpretative theory.
98
  The argument would be something like 
this: that the values of maintaining constitutional stability and averting constitutional crisis, 
and the value of enabling people to reflect on whether the law is worthy of obedience, make 
it the case that the powers of parliament and courts depends on the empirically ascertainable 
beliefs of most officials.
99
   As Allan rightly says, however, it is highly doubtful whether 
one could ever find the necessary consensus among officials to support such an interpreta-
tion.
100
  A more promising EFT interpretation of the constitution is one based on the work 
of Raz and taken up by Barber.
101
  Here is a sketch of that 'law as authority' interpretation:  
 
(Law as Authority) The value of guiding individuals to act in accordance with right reason 
makes it the case that legal norms must be capable of being obeyed or followed.  The identi-
fication of a legal norm therefore cannot require controversial moral judgment.  Laws must 
take the form of empirically ascertainable directives, rules or official utterances.
102
  
 
What stands out about this interpretation when placed alongside Allan's is the starkly con-
trasting conceptions of law and the rule of law.   For Allan, law - understood as thick con-
                                                 
97
 See, in particular, Dworkin, Law's Empire n 4 above, chs. 1 and 2.   
98
 Goldsworthy attempts such an interpretative defence himself, but he fundamentally misunderstands the 
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ception of the rule of law - is sovereign.  For Raz, on the other hand, law is an instrumental 
tool in a state or constitution.
103
   Its narrow purpose is to communicate authoritative reasons 
for action to individuals.   It does not encapsulate any theory of justice or rights, and it is 
distinct from the 'rule of law'.   The rule of law - understood in a thin, formal, sense - he 
contends, has prima facie force only:  ‘it is just one of the virtues by which a legal system 
may be judged and by which it is to be judged’.104   The law will achieve its guidance func-
tion more efficiently if it satisfies the requirements of the rule of law, but that value might 
be outweighed by other reasons or values.
105
 As if to turn every last element of Allan's theo-
ry inside out, Raz denies that judges have a general duty to enforce the law; and he denies 
that individuals have a general obligation to obey the law.    
 
In line with his general approach in Sovereignty, Allan seeks to reject this Razian account 
on conceptual grounds.  He condemns the division between law and the rule of law as a 
'questionable dualism'.
106
   And he confidently proclaims that 'our general ideal of law'
107
 is 
such that legal argument is necessarily a form of moral argument (just as Raz and others 
confidently proclaim that legal argument is necessarily not a form of moral argument).  My 
aim in this section has been to steer Allan (and others) away from these types of dead-end 
conceptual exchanges.   The view I have put is that the disagreement between Allan, Raz, 
Hart/Goldsworthy, and others concerns which theory of law and government makes best 
moral sense of British legal and constitutional practice.   How we determine the content of 
the law and the constitution in Britain, and how we view the relationship between law and 
adjudication, law and the rule of law, law and convention, and so on, must ultimately de-
pend on how we resolve these deep interpretative disagreements.
108
     Law (or legality) is 
'sovereign' only in the very limited sense that every constitutional theory is predicated on 
some competing understanding of this concept.
109
     
 
 
INTERPRETATION, COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE RULE 
OF LAW AS INDEPENDENCE   
 
My second objection to Sovereignty goes to the relationship between the IT and Allan's the-
ory of the rule of law and common law constitutionalism.  The question is whether he 
means to offer his theory as the only possible interpretation of the constitution, or as the best 
one.    This is the ambiguity in the meaning of the IT that I flagged above.   There is textual 
evidence to support both understandings.    My contention is that the first understanding is 
philosophically flawed: it negates the very idea of interpretation.    The only way that Allan 
can vindicate his theory is by adopting the second understanding.   His difficulty then, how-
                                                 
103
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ever, is that British constitutional practice arguably lends itself more readily to a 'political' 
constitutionalist interpretation than a 'legal' or 'common law' constitutionalist one.     
 
In order to get to these conclusions, we first need to build a fuller picture than I have so far 
given of Allan's constitutional theory - and the way he links his theory to the IT.     A telling 
place to begin is his claim that the IT necessarily 'excludes any absolutist doctrine of par-
liamentary sovereignty'.
110
  The only permissible interpretation of parliamentary power is 
one of limited or legitimate authority.   This has significant implications for the role of 
courts.   He denies that there is any meaningful distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ ju-
dicial review.
111
  The common law constitution, he says, is distinct from both arrangements.     
Courts have a duty to interpret statutes in line with equal dignity and basic common law 
rights;
112
 and they will ordinarily be able to do so (as exemplified by Anisminic).
113
 But the 
rule of law requires that they possess the power to quash a measure where no such interpre-
tation is available (as with the Blue Eyed Babies Act).
114
      Allan denies that he is pitting a 
legal constitution against a rival political constitution.    He insists that every account of the 
constitution is both legal and political in so far as it must include some coherent account of 
the rule of law and the separation of powers.
115
     It is for courts to determine, case by case, 
the requirements of the rule of law, and the correct distribution of powers.      
 
The views just described make for a fascinating take on the HRA 1998.   For Allan, section 
3 of the Act merely replicates the pre-existing common law order.
116
  Common law reason-
ing involves precisely the same balancing of relevant considerations.  It embodies the pro-
portionality test.
117
  It therefore should not have mattered in the ex parte Smith case, he says, 
that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) had not been incorporated:
118
  
‘The court’s appraisal... fell short of what was necessary to protect the basic rights in is-
sue'.
119
     His view on section 4 of the Act is equally revealing.   His general attitude is that 
the measure is an 'interpretative failure'.
120
    It was too weak in the A case - the House of 
Lords should have invalidated or ignored the statute.
121
   And it was an 'abdication of re-
sponsiblity' for judges to grant a declaration in Bellinger.
122
 The logical endpoint of Allan's 
theory is that the HRA is practically otiose in Britain.   If Parliament were to repeal the Act, 
‘the underlying common law constitution would remain untouched...’123   More broadly, he 
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doubts whether any form of Bill of Rights can make a difference to common law legal sys-
tems.
124
       
 
We now come to our objection.   Allan assures us throughout Sovereignty that he means to 
advance his theory of the rule of law and common law constitutionalism as an interpretation 
of the constitution 'as it is' rather than as he would invent it.
125
   How do we distinguish in-
terpretation from invention?    For Dworkin, an interpreter must attempt to achieve an equi-
librium between the 'standing features' of a particular legal and constitutional practice, and 
the moral theory that best justifies those features: moral theory partly determines the content 
of the practice, and the standing features of the practice constrain the available range of 
moral theories.
126
  An interpreter of the British constitution, then, will need both to justify 
and explain (or explain away), for instance, the doctrine of precedent, legislation, statutory 
interpretation, and the collected propositions of law and the constitution generally held to be 
true.
127
  An inventer of a constitution, by contrast, will have no genuine regard for the stand-
ing features of British constitutional practice.  He will choose his moral theory according to 
its independent appeal alone.   He will then propose a constitutional practice that matches 
his moral theory - or he will chop and change an existing practice until it approximates to 
his theory.
128
 
 
Despite Allan's assurances to the contrary, his theory of common law constitutionalism and 
the rule of law often has more of a feel of invention than interpretation about it.     Take the 
following type of recurrent phrase: 
 
‘When we [interpret the constitution] - we are guided by a vision of the rule of law as a scheme of justice, 
implicit in our existing constitutional arrangements, at least when these are favourably regarded.   Even if the 
law on many questions falls some way short of the ideal of legality, preserving a genuine equality of free-
dom, we try to bring it as close as we can’.129 
 
If by 'implicit in our existing constitutional arrangements', he means whichever 'favourably 
regarded' conception of the rule of law, democracy, the separation of powers, justice and so 
forth is instantiated in British constitutional practice, then we will plausibly be in the realm 
of interpretation.    But Allan has rather fixed, preconceived ideas about what is 'implicit'.     
He thinks that a specific set of rule of law values, understood in a specific way are implicit; 
he thinks that specific fundamental common law rights are implicit; and he thinks that a 
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specific division of institutional powers is implicit.
130
      The task he seems to assign to the 
interpreter, then, is to bring British legal and constitutional practice 'as close as we can' to 
these essential features of the rule of law and constitutions.      If this is Allan's position, 
then it is not obviously an interpretative one.    We said above that interpretation is a two-
way process between constitutional practice and moral theory.    Allan's argument runs in 
one direction only.    In the manner of a constitutional inventer, he uses his theory of the 
rule of law as independence as a 'moral filter':
131
 any part of British constitutional practice 
that cannot be brought into line with a 'genuine equality of freedom' is deemed to be unlaw-
ful or unconsitutional.     Indeed, this is the very task that he reserves for judges in his ac-
count of constructive statutory interpretation.
132
      The existing practice, on this approach, 
plays no genuine part in determining the correct theory of the rule of law and other political 
values.     
 
Allan's views on the HRA perhaps reinforce this sense of invention over interpretation.    
Let us begin with some reasonably uncontentious observations about the Act and its imple-
mentation.   Parliament made a deliberate choice to draft it in the way that it did.  It might 
have adopted any number of other forms of rights protection, including one that gives judg-
es a power to invalidate statutes.  Courts have painstakingly set out to make sense of its spe-
cific scheme, and to decide cases in accordance with it - the Supreme Court has continually 
grappled with the questions of when to use section 3 and when to use section 4, and how to 
adapt the traditional Wednesbury standard of judicial review to the Strasbourg proportionali-
ty test.     The effect of Allan's arguments on the HRA - and on Bills of Rights in general - is 
that a legislative decision to create a particular framework of rights protection, and the at-
tempt by courts to work within that framework, can have no impact on the law.   People will 
have the same legal rights, duties and powers of individuals and institutions irrespective of 
the particular institutional decisions and practices one finds.   Once again, this approach 
fails to capture the dynamic of interpretation - an interaction between the object of interpre-
tation (the practice) and its purpose or value.   It can instead be seen as an attempt to 'ho-
mogenize' all constitutions without having regard for their different legal and political prac-
tices, history and traditions.
133
    
 
Let us now consider the second, alternative reading of the IT.     What if we read Allan as 
arguing that his moral theory of the rule of law and common law constitutionalism makes 
better moral sense of the 'standing features' of British constitutional practice than other 
'schemes of justice'?     On this reading – which is certainly the one that comes through most 
strongly in Sovereignty – Allan is doing precisely what an interpreter qua interpreter must: 
he is giving an account of British constitutional practice that matches his account of legiti-
macy.  But I think another difficulty now stands in his way.    Many of the salient features 
of the practice point towards a political constitutionalist conception of democracy, the rule 
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of law and the separation of powers.    By this, I broadly mean a political theory that favours 
a majoritarian model of democracy over a right-based model; one that conceives of the rule 
of law as a narrow, formal principle; one that favours the legislature over courts as the pri-
mary forum for resolving disagreements about rights and the constitution; and one that 
seeks to minimise the adjudicative role of judges.  In sum, a political theory that plausibly 
justifies parliamentary sovereignty and other tenets of British constitutional orthodoxy.
134
    
We have already considered some of the evidence in this direction.  The declaration of in-
compatibility is arguably designed to facilitate dialogue between the courts and parliament 
on the meaning and content of rights.
135
   It can be seen as way of allowing citizens, via 
their elected representatives, to participate in decisions about their own rights.
136
   On this 
view, the declarations in Bellinger, A and elsewhere were not 'interpretative failures' or 'ab-
dications of responsibility', but legitimate attempts to honour the prevailing political theory 
of the day.
137
   If Parliament were in future to introduce a British Bill of Rights with a 'dem-
ocratic override' provision, we could reasonably expect courts to enforce that measure on 
the same basis.    
 
More evidence for a 'political' reading of the constitution can arguably be found in the very 
case that Allan makes central to his common law constitutionalist interpretation of the con-
stitution, Prolife.
138
    His view is that the Court of Appeal and the minority in the House of 
Lords correctly read the 'taste and decency' provision of the Broadcasting Act in the light of 
the constitutional principle of freedom of speech.    He thinks that the majority in the House 
of Lords erred in attempting to give effect to the literal meaning of the statute.   Their deci-
sion reflected a ‘narrow, authoritarian vision of the legal order’ rather than one that made 
judges the ‘servants of the constitution or legal order’.139   He concludes that 'if we think 
that the law and liberty are necessarily connected values, regulating the permissible bounda-
ries of governmental power, we will prefer the judgment of the Court of Appeal.'
140
  The 
difficulty here, once again, is that our role as interpreters is not to impose our preferred 
moral theory on judicial decisions (and other parts of the constitution); it is to identify the 
moral theory that underpins those decisions.  The House of Lords decision can plausibly be 
understood as promoting Parliament's right to balance freedom of expression with public 
policy.   The majority explicitly saw things in this way.
141
   Of course, it is open to Allan to 
contend that political readings of constitutional practice are (interpretatively) unconvincing, 
or that particular judicial decisions – those potentially favourable to political constitutional-
ists – are interpretative ‘mistakes’ given the overall scheme of principle underlying the con-
stitution.    The suspicion, at times, is that he is unwilling to entertain the possibility of a po-
litical reading of the cases.   
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Two further matters remain for brief discussion.    First, we noted above Allan’s view that 
legal and political practice are 'too intertwined and interdependent to sustain [a distinction 
between the legal and political constitution].'
142
   I have attempted to convey a very different 
view in this review article,  namely that there is scope for highly distinct legal and political 
interpretative theories of constitution, based respectively on non-positivist and positivist-
inspired theories of law and adjudication (or the separation of powers). These contrasting 
theories, I have suggested, can compete to explain cases such as Prolife and Liversidge.     
My own view, then, is that the political/legal constitution distinction is an important and 
under-explored one.    
 
The second matter relates closely to the first.  Allan will no doubt object to a political con-
stitutionalist reading of Prolife and other cases on the basis that political constitutionalism 
has no coherent theory of adjudication.
143
    He will deny that statutory texts have a literal 
meaning or a meaning that was intended by parliament.     He will insist that there can be no 
sharp divide between the 'strict legalism' of a statutory text and 'constitutional principle in 
the courts at the most fundamental level'.
144
     It may well be that there are difficulties with 
some of leading attempts by political constitutionalists to carve out a role for judges.
145
     I 
have suggested above, however, that there are a range of sophisticated EFT theories of ad-
judication available to political constitutionalists.      On a superficial level, the gap between 
Allan's own favoured theory and these EFT theories may be far smaller than he supposes.
146
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Sovereignty is the most developed and powerful defence of common law constitutionalism - 
and the most devastating critique of constitutional orthodoxy - to date.       It is essential 
reading for judges, lawyers, academics and students.     Part of its great value lies in Allan's 
comprehensive elaboration of these different visions of the constitution, and in his dissec-
tion of the many public law debates that surround them.   It is difficult to think an area of 
British constitutional practice and theory that escapes his detailed attention.    This review 
has barely touched the surface of his wide ranging analyses.  The most significant contribu-
tion of the book, however, is the way that Allan explicitly connects mainstream UK public 
law to debates in legal and political theory.  He demonstrates that every theory or doctrine 
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in public law inescapably assumes a position in these more abstract debates.    And he ar-
gues emphatically that only the anti-positivist, interpretavist position can be sustained. 
 
In presenting legal and constitutional argument as a species of moral argument, Allan has 
brought to British constitutional scholarship what Dworkin brought to US constitutional 
scholarship.   To borrow a fitting phrase, he has helped British constitutional theory to 'find 
its soul'.
147
    My aim in this review has not been to counter Allan's interpretative project, 
but to suggest some ways in which he can strengthen it, and remain faithful to it.    In par-
ticular, I have argued that his interpretative commitments demand that he sees positivist ac-
counts of the constitution as rival interpretations to his own rule of law as independence in-
terpretation. This is to say that it is morally controversial whether, or in what sense, law is 
sovereign in the constitution.     I have also suggested that the interpreter of the British con-
stitution (and of constitutions in general) must show a greater sensitivity to local practices 
and principles than one perhaps finds in Sovereignty.  Specifically, I have argued that Allan 
needs to be more open to a 'political' reading of the constitution.  When understood in these 
ways, Sovereignty has the potential to precipitate an exciting new phase in public law - and 
indeed in legal and constitutional theory.     
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